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1. Introduction
Various economic assumptions have an important role in calculating defined benefit
obligations, plan assets, and defined benefit cost, and the changes in these assumptions have
significant effects on a firm’s balance sheet and income statement. Several papers reveal the
effects of determination of discount rates, expected rates of return on plan assets (ERR), and
rates of future salary increases on financial statements. For example, Okumura (2005) states
that, if a firm increases the discount rate one percentage point from 3% to 4% under certain
conditions, defined benefit obligations will drop by 23%. Bauman and Shaw (2014) attempt
to show the magnitude of the effect of sensitivity of defined benefit cost on potential
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changes in the discount rate or ERR. They report that firms decreasing their discount rates
produce an 8% decline in their operating income, and those increasing rates boost it by 9%
on average. With regard to ERRs, firms decreasing rates cut their operating income by
2.8%, and those increasing rates raise it 3.5%. Other papers discuss firms’ use of these
assumptions for earnings management.
ASBJ Statement No.26: Accounting Standard for Retirement Benefits (ASBJ Statement
26) states that the discount rate is determined based on the yields on safe and secure long
bonds. These include government bonds, government agency securities, and high-grade
corporate bonds (ASBJ Statement 26, par.20). It appears that the discount rate can be
determined in an objective way based on this information. On the other hand, the ERR is
determined based on firm-specific information, including its investment portfolio and plan
asset management in the past. Firms might have an opportunity to change the ERR for
earnings management. Therefore, this paper’s aim is to show if pension components and
other financial statement factors affect the determination of the rates, which have a
significant impact on a firm’s income statement.
2. Setting Rules for Expected Rate of Return on Plan Assets
ASBJ Guidance No.25: Guidance on Accounting Standard for Retirement Benefits (ASBJ
Guidance 25) states that the ERR is determined based on investment portfolio, management
performance in the past, management policy, and the market for plan assets that firms hold
(ASBJ Guidance 25, par.25). The return is calculated based on the ERR multiplied by plan
assets at the beginning of the period (ASBJ Statement 26, par.23). The difference between
the actual rate and the ERR is recognized as actuarial gains and losses in defined benefit
cost (ASBJ Guidance 25, par.34). The amount can be recognized over the average remaining
service life of the firm’s employees (ASBJ Statement 26, par.24). The amount which is not
recognized for the period is recognized as actuarial gain or loss in other comprehensive
income (ASBJ Statement 26, par.24). The ERR can be changed when the change in the rate
would have a significant effect on the amount of profit or loss for the period, which is
called the principle of changes in actuarial assumptions (ASBJ Guidance 25, par.31).1
Under ASBJ Statement 26, the following information is required to be disclosed in the
footnotes (ASBJ Statement 26, par.30):
(a) Summary of retirement benefit plans that a firm adopts;
1 Significant change is not clearly defined in the guidance. However, the principle of changes in discount
rate is stated as follows: a significant change in the discount rate is considered to have occurred when
the defined benefit obligations as measured using a discount rate at the end of the year are compared to
those at the end of the previous year, and the difference exceeds 10% of the previous year’s obligations
(ASBJ Guidance 25, par.30).
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(b) The breakdown of changes in defined benefit obligations and plan assets in
the period;
(c) The breakdown of defined benefit obligations, plan assets, and defined
benefit liability;
(d) Profit or loss related to retirement benefits;
(e) The amount of actuarial gains and losses and past service cost recognized in
other comprehensive income;
(f) The amount of unrecognized actuarial gain or loss and unrecognized past
service cost recognized in accumulated other comprehensive income;
(g) Items regarding plan assets including the allocation of plan assets; and
(h) Actuarial assumptions (discount rates, ERRs, and other important assumptions).
Items (b), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) are related to the ERR. The International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) issued revised International Accounting Standard No.19: Employee
Benefits (IAS19) in 2011, and firms have been required to adopt it since fiscal 2013. The
revised IAS19 states that the ERR was eliminated for calculating the return on plan assets,
because the IASB found it difficult to determine the return in an objective way, and the
possibility existed that the return would include some portion that occurred not simply from
the passage of time (IAS19, par.BC78). Currently, the return on plan assets is calculated by
multiplying the fair value of plan assets at the beginning of the period by the discount rate,
which is determined by reference to market yields at the end of the reporting period on high
quality corporate bonds (IAS19, pars.83, 125). Under Japanese accounting standards, firms
can determine their ERRs at their discretion because they utilize firm-specific information to
set their ERRs; therefore, there are several disclosure items related to ERR which would
provide financial statement users useful information for predicting the determination.
3. Expected Rate of Return on Plan Assets Adopted by Japanese Listed Firms
Generally two types of public pension plans, National Pension and Employees’ Pension
Insurance, and one or two types of corporate pension plans — including Employees’
Pension Fund, Defined-Benefit Corporate Pension, or Defined-Contribution Pension Plan —
are provided to employees in Japan. Firms can decide whether they offer pension plans to
their employees, and they choose which pension plan is provided. Recently, firms have
tended to change a part or all of their defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans
owing to the volatility and the significance of the effect of defined benefit plans on their
financial statements.
Table 1 shows the number of firms selected for analysis in this study. From fiscal 2000
to 2014, the number of firms listed on Japanese stock exchanges grew from about 1,800 to
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2,800. With the purpose of showing the range of and changes in ERRs, this study uses the
number of firms listed on Japanese stock exchanges that disclose both plan assets and the
ERR. All firms treated in this study adopt Japanese accounting standards. The “Total” row
at the bottom of Table 1 shows these numbers for the 2000 to 2014 time-span.
Table 2 shows the range of ERRs firms adopt. Most firms tend to choose ERRs within a
wide range of 1.00% to 3.99%. The ERRs are determined based on investment portfolio,
management performance in the past, management policy, and the market for plan assets
that firms hold (ASBJ Guidance 25, par.25). Comparing ERRs to the range of discount rates
Japanese listed firms adopt, about 90% of firms choose discount rates ranging from 1.00%
to 2.99%, whereas the range of ERRs on plan assets is much wider. The mean and standard
deviation for the ERRs are also higher than those for discount rates.2 Table 2 suggests that
firms can make discretionary decisions on setting ERRs.
Table 1. Yearly Totals of Firms Selected
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Firms Listed on Japanese Stock 1,834 1,903 1,995 2,086 2,191 2,276 2,356 2,416Exchanges
Excluding Firms:
-with Less-Than-12-Month 13 8 6 9 15 8 9 11Accounting Periods
-without Plan Assets 467 186 248 304 380 449 529 568
-not Disclosing Expected 179 236 252 273 288 291 290 297Rates of Return
Total 1,175 1,473 1,489 1,500 1,508 1,528 1,528 1,540
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Firms Listed on Japanese Stock 2,473 2,534 2,593 2,694 2,755 2,810 2,837Exchanges
Excluding Firms:
-with Less-Than-12-Month 4 13 19 19 20 20 16Accounting Periods
-without Plan Assets 629 703 805 961 1,010 1,059 1,121
-not Disclosing Expected 285 277 252 245 254 255 242Rates of Return
Total 1,555 1,541 1,517 1,469 1,471 1,476 1,458
2 Kasaoka, E. (2015). “The Determinants of Discount Rates on Retirement Benefits in Japan,” International
Review of Business, No.15, p.61.
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Table 3 shows how often and by how much firms change their ERRs from fiscal 2000 to
2014. As explained above, the ERR is set based on a firm’s investment portfolio or the
market capitalization of plan assets. Japanese firms tend to invest 15% to 32% of their plan
assets in domestic stocks, 15% to 20% in foreign stocks, 20% to 30% in domestic bonds,
and 10% to 13% in foreign bonds.3 The change in ERR is strongly influenced by security
Table 2. The Range of ERR Firms Adopt
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Under 1.0% 12 32 103 202 196 175 135 109
1.0% to 1.99% 101 196 255 291 292 305 291 290
2.0% to 2.99% 153 278 473 606 668 690 692 696
3.0% to 3.99% 523 596 427 270 236 250 271 283
4.0% to 4.99% 250 257 166 88 71 66 85 96
5.0% to 5.99% 107 80 40 14 15 8 20 25
6.0% to 6.99% 15 16 7 5 6 7 5 8
7.0% to 7.99% 3 4 4 6 4 10 9 11
Over 8.0% 11 14 14 18 20 17 20 22
No. of Firms 1,175 1,473 1,489 1,500 1,508 1,528 1,528 1,540
Mean 3.421 3.118 2.624 2.229 2.191 2.211 2.344 2.437
Std. Dev. 1.262 1.310 1.346 1.389 1.331 1.295 1.312 1.356
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Under 1.0% 116 179 163 149 147 128 118
1.0% to 1.99% 295 337 352 369 416 447 485
2.0% to 2.99% 717 698 693 665 656 645 618
3.0% to 3.99% 272 218 215 205 179 179 154
4.0% to 4.99% 80 50 40 24 20 26 43
5.0% to 5.99% 29 15 12 12 12 12 23
6.0% to 6.99% 14 11 12 14 9 11 6
7.0% to 7.99% 11 13 16 15 18 16 4
Over 8.0% 21 20 14 16 14 12 7
Number of Firms 1,555 1,541 1,517 1,469 1,471 1,476 1,458
Mean 2.399 2.180 2.156 2.132 2.066 2.080 2.040
Std. Dev. 1.361 1.386 1.332 1.342 1.288 1.261 1.123
3 Pension Fund Association, “The Survey and Comment on Plan Asset Management,” http://www.pfa.or.
jp/activity/tokei/shisanunyo/jittai/index.html.
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Table 3. The Frequency and the Level of Changes in ERR
2000-
2001
2001-
2002
2002-
2003
2003-
2004
2004-
2005
2005-
2006
2006-
2007
2007-
2008
2008-
2009
Decreasing ERR
x < -1.0% 115 202 171 43 23 17 16 57 128
-1.0%  x < -0.5% 89 214 151 52 35 20 14 46 76
-0.5%  x < -0.1% 104 212 253 131 85 36 28 61 113
-0.1%  x < 0% 5 2 9 14 13 16 11 8 13
313 630 584 240 156 89 69 172 330
No Change
0% 818 803 841 1,111 1,210 1,212 1,264 1,229 1,121
Increasing ERR
0% < x  0.1% 3 - - 7 9 9 10 18 15
0.1% < x  0.5% 14 8 12 34 43 58 72 42 24
0.5% < x  1.0% 13 1 4 32 29 46 36 26 10
x > 1.0% 12 2 15 38 46 86 62 31 15
42 11 31 111 127 199 180 117 64
No. of Firms 1,173 1,444 1,456 1,462 1,493 1,500 1,513 1,518 1,515
Mean -0.283 -0.484 -0.380 -0.034 0.018 0.139 0.093 -0.062 -0.236
Std. Dev. 0.787 0.781 0.794 0.669 0.560 0.720 0.583 0.676 0.798
2009-
2010
2010-
2011
2011-
2012
2012-
2013
2013-
2014
Decreasing ERR
x < -1.0% 44 47 28 23 23
-1.0%  x < -0.5% 38 51 58 52 42
-0.5%  x < -0.1% 78 70 108 91 74
-0.1%  x < 0% 21 24 20 20 18
181 192 214 186 157
No Change
0% 1,199 1,177 1,157 1,114 1,064
Increasing ERR
0% < x  0.1% 11 19 12 17 27
0.1% < x  0.5% 42 26 40 44 68
0.5% < x  1.0% 23 17 18 33 59
x > 1.0% 39 17 15 60 59
115 79 85 154 213
No. of Firms 1,495 1,448 1,456 1,454 1,434
Mean -0.030 -0.061 -0.059 0.030 0.080
Std. Dev. 0.649 0.573 0.421 0.678 0.641
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Figure 1. Rates of Return Categorized by Assets
Source: Pension Fund Association, “The Survey and Comment on Plan Asset Management,” http://
www.pfa.or.jp/activity/tokei/shisanunyo/jittai/index.html. These rates are calculated based on
the following information by the association: Domestic Stocks (TOPIX), Domestic Bonds
(NOMURA-BPI), Foreign Stocks (MSC-KOKUSAI), Foreign Bonds (Citi world government
bond index).
markets. Figure 1 shows the rates of return on domestic and foreign securities from 2000 to
2014.
On average, Japanese firms invest 35% to 50% of their plan assets in domestic and
foreign stocks. Figure 1 shows that the movement for the rate of return on Japanese stocks
is linked to that on foreign stocks. In years when the average rate of return on Japanese
stocks is negative from 2000 to 2002, and 2007 to 2008, more firms decreased their ERRs.
On the other hand, when the average rate of return on Japanese stocks was positive from
2003 to 2006 and after 2012, more firms increased their ERRs. However, most firms tend
not to change their ERRs; indeed, each year about 55% to 80% of firms record no change.
With regard to the level of changes in ERRs, when the average rate of return on
Japanese stocks was negative from 2000 to 2002 and 2007 to 2008, the number of firms
decreasing their ERRs more than 0.5 percentage points increased. When the average rate of
return on Japanese stocks was stable or increased, firms tended to decrease the rates less
than 0.5 points. The same pattern can be seen for firms increasing their ERRs. When the
average rate of return on Japanese stocks was positive from 2003 to 2006 and after 2012,
firms increasing their ERRs raised them more than 0.5 points. Therefore, the determination
of the ERR is affected by social and economic circumstances.
Table 4 shows the effect of expected return on plan assets and other pension items on
financial statements. Over the 2000 to 2014 period, the average impact of the expected
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Table 4. The Effect of Expected Return on Plan Assets on Financial Statements
ER/DBC ER/OPI ER/NI PA/TA DBL/TL UAGL/NA
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
2000 0.119 0.467 0.089 2.023 0.189 2.746 0.075 0.074 0.124 0.107 0.164 0.689
2001 0.275 0.438 0.057 1.234 0.076 0.463 0.072 0.073 0.177 0.188 0.155 0.832
2002 0.139 0.702 0.103 1.279 0.112 0.920 0.056 0.054 0.191 0.205 0.171 0.575
2003 0.078 0.286 0.036 0.231 0.048 0.147 0.058 0.053 0.154 0.171 0.116 0.973
2004 0.087 0.160 0.073 1.669 0.047 0.189 0.059 0.053 0.136 0.154 0.045 0.135
2005 0.111 0.301 0.034 0.221 0.049 0.181 0.067 0.062 0.100 0.141 0.024 0.106
2006 0.138 1.145 0.024 0.244 0.028 0.780 0.068 0.063 0.086 0.139 0.017 0.089
2007 0.193 0.519 0.039 0.158 0.060 0.320 0.062 0.056 0.101 0.139 0.036 0.112
2008 0.119 0.551 0.023 0.738 -0.001 0.649 0.055 0.050 0.140 0.173 0.067 0.164
2009 0.084 0.094 0.010 0.804 0.011 0.922 0.061 0.054 0.123 0.159 0.044 0.125
2010 0.102 0.105 0.031 0.162 0.021 0.980 0.061 0.053 0.119 0.157 0.040 0.088
2011 0.093 0.252 0.036 0.235 0.043 0.454 0.063 0.054 0.115 0.153 0.039 0.088
2012 0.102 0.118 0.013 0.296 0.043 0.508 0.067 0.058 0.108 0.143 0.029 0.079
2013 0.125 0.151 0.021 0.282 0.033 0.192 0.069 0.060 0.095 0.119 0.017 0.070
2014 0.150 0.224 0.043 0.312 0.025 0.517 0.160 0.239 0.084 0.111 0.028 0.900
ER=expected return on plan assets, DBC=defined benefit cost, OPI=operating income, NI=net income, PA=plan
assets, TA=total assets, DBL=defined benefit liability, TL=total liabilities, UAGL=unrecognized actuarial gain or
loss, NA=net assets
return on defined benefit cost ranges from 8% to 27%. The return also had a positive effect
on operating income; the ratio ranges from 1% to 10%.
As for the impact of expected return on plan assets on net income, it ranges from
positive 1% to 19%. The year 2008 is an exception. That year, with the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers, the world economy took a sharp downturn. Many firms recorded losses,
and the ERR impact on net income is negative.
Other pension items also have significant effects on financial statements over the 2000 to
2014 period. The ratio of plan assets to total assets ranges from 5% to 16%, and defined
benefit liability to total liabilities ranges from 8% to 19%. The amount of unrecognized
actuarial gain or loss is strongly affected by bond and stock prices, and its ratio to net assets
ranges from 1% to 17%. The table shows that unrecognized actuarial gain or loss is highly
volatile.
4. Prior Research
Actuarial assumptions have an important role in calculating defined benefit obligations,
plan assets, defined benefit liability, and defined benefit cost. There are several researches
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studying the effect of changes in actuarial assumptions on the financial statements. As
explained in Section 1, Okumura (2005) shows that if a firm increases the discount rate one
percentage point from 3% to 4% under certain conditions — (a) employees’ average age is
40, (b) retirement age is 60, and (c) the period of benefit is 15 years — then the amount of
defined benefit obligations decreases by 23%. Bauman and Shaw (2014) demonstrate a
reduction in discount rates by firms has a negative effect on their operating income, while
increasing rates has a positive effect. With regard to ERRs, the same result can be shown.
Kasaoka (2015) discusses the required disclosures of sensitivity analysis of Japanese firms
adopting IFRSs for their discount rates. The result indicates that when a firm decreases the
discount rate by 0.5 points, the amount of defined benefit obligations increases 5.9% on
average. On the other hand, when a firm increases the discount rate by 0.5 points, defined
benefit obligations decrease 5.2%.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze if pension components and other financial
statement factors affect the determination of the ERRs. There are several papers discussing
firms’ use of actuarial assumptions for earnings management. In Japan, accounting standards
for retirement benefits require firms to disclose their discount rates and ERRs. In the US,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.87: Employers’ Accounting for Pensions
and Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.158: Employers’ Accounting for
Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans require firms to disclose their
discount rates, ERRs, and future salary increases. Most papers investigate the effect of
changes in these assumptions.4 For example, Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1995), Godwin et.
al (1996), and Asthana (1999) test the relationship between firms’ discount rates and several
factors which might motivate managers to smooth earnings. Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue
(1995) find that the magnitudes of leverage and pension funding affect the choice of
discount rate. Godwin et. al (1996) suggest that firms with stronger dividend restrictions,
lower earnings, and higher leverage are more likely to increase their discount rates. Asthana
(1999) concludes that firms with greater profitability, greater cash flows from operating
activities, lower tax liability, smaller debt, and better pension funding status tend to choose
conservative actuarial choices to maximize contributions.
As for ERRs, Comprix and Muller (2006) and Bergstresser et. al (2006) present evidence
that managers appear to change them for earnings management in response to incentives,
such as cash compensation for CEOs. Li and Klumpes (2013) test whether firms’ ERRs are
associated with firm-specific opportunistic factors in the UK from 1998 to 2002. They
include the debt to equity ratio, return on assets (ROA), plan asset composition, pension
4 However, it is also important to understand that other actuarial assumptions, including mortality or rates
of employee turnover, have a significant effect on financial statements.
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funding, actual rate of return on plan assets, and other factors in their models, and find that
the ERR is positively related to the debt to equity ratio, which means that UK managers
change their ERRs when there is a high probability of technical default under the loan
covenant. Lew (2009) also studies whether firms exploit their actuarial assumptions for
earnings management purposes. His study reveals that earnings per share, actual return on
plan assets, and pension funding are related to the determinants of firms’ ERRs.
Adams et. al (2011) use a sample of firms over the period 1991 to 2005 to examine if
they have an opportunity to inflate earnings through the determination of their ERRs. The
study finds that the ERR is not overstated based on several benchmarks, including
contemporaneous actual returns, historical actual rates of return, and expected returns based
on asset allocation. The paper concludes that firms do not use their ERRs for earnings
management. Newell et. al (2002) compare the ERRs between firms with plans that are
better funded and those less well funded. They find that firms with better funded plans set
their ERRs higher than those with less well funded plans. This suggests that those with less
well funded plans have a more conservative investing strategy. Blankley and Swanson
(1995) find a strong relationship between ERRs and the actual rate of return, and conclude
that the ERR is not used in order to manage earnings or funding by firms.
Summarizing the researches, we find changes in the ERR have an impact on defined
benefit cost in the income statement and unrecognized actuarial gain or loss in other
comprehensive income. Firms can determine the ERR at their discretion, based on
investment portfolio, management performance in the past, or management policy. Several
papers conclude that the ERR is used for earnings management. Based on these researches,
a firm’s leverage, profitability, cash flows, and tax-paying status might affect the
determination of ERR if a firm uses it for earnings management.
5. Hypothesis Development and Research Design
This paper aims to reveal whether pension components and other financial factors affect
the determination of ERRs. Under Japanese accounting standards, the expected return on
plan assets is recognized as a part of defined benefit cost, which is disclosed in cost of sales
or selling, general, and administrative expenses (ASBJ Statement 26, par.28). Therefore, the
change in ERR would have an impact on operating income. The difference between the
expected return on plan assets and the actual return is recognized as actuarial gains and
losses, and they can be recognized over the average service life of employees. The amount
of actuarial gains and losses not recognized in the period is disclosed as unrecognized
actuarial gain or loss in other comprehensive income. If a firm sets the ERR much higher
than the actual rate, it has to recognize unrecognized actuarial loss, which would have a
negative effect on other comprehensive income in net assets. There are several factors that
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might affect the determination of ERRs include leverage, profitability, cash flows, tax, firm
size, pension items, and others if firms use their ERRs for earnings management purposes.
The detail of each variable is explained below. In explaining the effect of pension
components and other financial factors on the determination of ERRs, the following
multiple regression model is employed:
ERRit = α0 + α1LEVit + α2OPIit + α3CASHit + α4TAXit + α5FUNDit + α6DBSIZEit
+ α7HORIZONit + α8DRit + α9SIZEit + α10JSTOCKit + α11JBONDit
+ Industryit + Yearit + eit (1)
where ERRit is the level of the ERR disclosed in footnotes under Japanese accounting
standards for each period. To consider the time series and industry classification, panel data
analysis is adopted.
(1) Leverage (LEV)
As explained above, the expected return on plan assets has an impact on operating
income. It does not directly influence leverage. However, firms can improve their leverage
through adopting higher ERRs, resulting in decreased estimated defined benefit cost. Li and
Klumpes (2013) include leverage in their model, and conclude that leverage is positively
related to the determination of ERR. In this paper, the debt to equity ratio is employed,
which represents firms’ leverage and capital risk. The ratio has an effect on the cost of
capital, which is the rate of return a firm is expected to earn. The ratio is calculated as total
liabilities divided by shareholders’ equity. The effect of pension components is eliminated
from the calculation. Before the current accounting standards were adopted in fiscal 2013,
unrecognized actuarial gain or loss — the difference between ERR and the actual rate of
return — was off-balance sheet. Therefore, when a firm’s leverage is higher, there is a
possibility that the firm adopts a higher ERR to reduce and equalize the cost over several
years. The leverage hypothesis can be stated as follows:
H1: Firms with higher leverage adopt higher ERRs to improve their leverage.
(2) Profitability (OPI)
Adopting a higher ERR leads to less defined benefit cost, thus profitability increases. The
change in ERR has a direct impact on the amount of operating income. Adams et. al (2011)
and Li and Klumpes (2013) include ROA in their models to examine if a firm’s financial
condition and profitability influence the determination of ERR. Adams et. al (2011)
investigate whether firms with significant plan assets relative to operating income might
manipulate their reported earnings by adopting higher ERRs. Profitability is defined as
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operating income divided by the average amount of beginning and ending total assets for
the period. When a firm’s profitability is lower, it might adopt higher ERR to increase
operating income. Thus, the following hypothesis is employed:
H2: Firms with lower profitability adopt higher ERRs to increase their profitability.
(3) Cash Flows from Operating Activities (CASH)
When defined benefit cost is recognized, the amount affects the balance sheet and the
income statement. It is necessary to adjust the cash flow of defined benefit cost and other
factors in cash flows from operating activities. The cash flow related to retirement benefits
is recognized as changes in provisions and retirement benefit liabilities. The changes in
provisions and retirement benefit liabilities is calculated in consideration of the amount of
defined benefit cost, the contribution to pension funds, and payments of retirement benefits.
When the amount of defined benefit cost exceeds that of other items, it has a positive effect
on cash flows from operating income. The expected return on plan assets decreases the
amount of defined benefit cost; therefore, it has a negative effect on cash flows from
operating income.
H3: Firms with lower cash flows from operating activities adopt lower ERRs to increase
their cash flows from operating activities.
(4) Tax-Paying Status (TAX)
Tax minimization is an important reason why firms provide pension plans to their
employees. In Japan, all pension contributions can be recognized as expense for the period.
The tax-paying status is indicated by the effective tax rate, measured as total income taxes
divided by net income before taxes for the period. Decreases in ERR increase defined
benefit cost, and as a result it reduces net income before taxes. Feldstein and Morck (1983)
conclude that firms with overfunded status adopt lower interest rate assumptions to receive
tax benefits. In Japan, most firms have underfunded status. Less than 10% of firms have
overfunded status in this research. Therefore, it might be difficult to see the effect of a
company’s tax burden on the determination of ERRs. However, there is a possibility that
firms might adopt lower ERRs to reduce the amount of taxes they pay. The fourth
hypothesis is as follows:
H4: Firms with higher effective tax rates adopt lower ERRs to decrease their tax burden.
(5) Pension Funding (FUND)
There are several papers investigating the effect of a firm’s pension funding status on the
choice of ERRs. Pension funding is calculated as plan assets divided by Projected Benefit
Obligations (PBO). Newell et. al (2002), Lew (2009), and Li and Klumpes (2013) employ
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the pension funding variable to see if it affects the level of ERRs. Lew (2009) finds that
firms with lower pension funding status set their ERRs higher than those in a previous year
to smooth reported amounts of defined benefit cost. Li and Klumpes (2013) also investigate
whether firms with lower pension funding status choose higher ERRs. Thus ERR would be
negatively related to pension funding status.
H5: Firms with lower pension funding status adopt higher ERRs to improve their funding
status.
(6) Pension Size (DBSIZE)
Pension size is defined as the natural logarithm of defined benefit obligations. Pension
size cannot be known from firm size, because if a large firm combines several pension plans
including defined contribution plans or provides defined benefit plans only to employees in
countries that require defined benefit plans, pension size would be smaller. Firms with larger
pension plans have to recognize more defined benefit cost. Therefore, they might adopt
higher ERRs to decrease the amount of defined benefit cost for the period. The following
hypothesis is employed:
H6: Firms with larger pension plans adopt higher ERRs to reduce the amount of defined
benefit cost.
However, if a firm’s pension size is large, it can achieve economies of scale for its
pension management. The coefficient sign can be positive even though firms do not use
ERRs for earnings management.
(7) Investment Horizon (HORIZON)
Investment horizon is measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of PBO to current
service cost. According to Amir et. al (2010), investment horizon has an important role
when firms determine their plan asset allocation. Firms with relatively young workforces
should invest in stocks, because defined benefit obligations for employees with short service
lives are relatively long-term and primarily influenced by salary increases which are related
to stocks. In contrast, firms with relatively mature workforces should invest in bonds,
because defined benefit obligations for employees with long service lives are relatively short
-term and primarily influenced by interest rates related to bonds. Amir et. al (2010) include
this variable in their models to see if it is related to a firm’s plan asset allocation. If the
investment horizon is longer, firms invest their plan assets in stocks. Therefore, when a firm
uses ERR for earnings management, it is expected that the correlation between investment
horizon and ERR is negative.
H7: Firms with shorter investment horizons adopt higher ERRs to reduce the amount of
defined benefit cost for the period.
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(8) Discount Rate (DR)
As explained in Section 2, IAS19, as revised in 2011, requires firms to use discount rates
to calculate return on plan assets, because it would be difficult to determine the return in an
objective way, and firms might make discretionary decisions on setting ERRs (IAS19, par
BC78). Under Japanese accounting standards, the discount rate is determined based on
yields on safe and secure long bonds. These include government bonds, government agency
securities, and high-grade corporate bonds (ASBJ Statement 26, par.20). Japanese listed
firms tend to set their ERRs higher than their discount rates. However, if we compare the
movement of yields on Japanese government bonds with that of average ERR, they are
similar. Decreasing a discount rate increases the amounts of PBO and service cost. If a firm
attempts to reduce the negative effect of retirement benefits on their financial statements, it
would be better to adopt a high discount rate, and an ERR that is higher than the discount
rate. Therefore, firms might make reference to discount rates to determine their ERRs, and
control the amount of defined benefit cost.
H8: Firms with higher discount rates adopt higher ERRs.
(9) Other Variables
Market benchmarks of stocks and bonds (JSTOCK and JBOND), firm size (SIZE),
industry classification (Industry), and year dummy variables (Year) are added to our models.
The ERR is determined based on investment portfolio, management performance in the past,
management policy, and the market for plan assets that firms hold (ASBJ Guidance 25,
par.25). The allocation of plan assets is different in each firm; however, market benchmarks
can be an important indicator for firms to set their ERRs and also for investors to judge if
firms determine their ERRs appropriately. As shown in Figure 1 in Section 3, market
benchmarks for securities fluctuate widely every year. In practice, firms tend to refer to past
3- to 5-year plan asset management yields to determine their ERRs. Therefore, 5-year
average yields on Japanese stocks and bonds are employed for this model. Other variables
are included as general control variables.
6. Empirical Evidence
This empirical analysis is based on fourteen years of annual report data. The time period
of this study is from fiscal 2001 (one year after the Accounting Standard for Retirement
Benefits was introduced) through the latest year, fiscal 2014, for which data are available.
Fiscal year 2000 was excluded, owing to the impact from changes in accounting standards
for retirement benefits and financial instruments on a firm’s financial statements for the
year. Firms included in this research design exclude banks and insurance firms. Table 1 in
Section 3 shows the number of firms selected that set ERRs and disclose plan assets. A
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for the Effect of Pension Components and Other Financial
Statement Factors on ERR
ERR LEV OPI CASH TAX FUND DBSIZE HORIZON DR SIZE JSTOCK JBOND
Mean 2.188 1.658 0.059 0.058 0.368 0.580 -1.072 1.261 2.045 4.900 2.402 2.843
Median 2.000 1.025 0.052 0.058 0.409 0.564 -1.043 1.277 2.000 4.808 2.756 2.050
Min -3.300 -34.764 -0.285 -1.311 -74.626 0.000 -2.973 -0.311 0.150 3.275 -8.660 0.832
Max 10.900 83.731 0.419 1.730 96.900 4.490 0.140 2.666 8.560 7.232 15.176 11.544
Std. Dev. 1.141 2.597 0.044 0.059 2.093 0.279 0.352 0.198 0.658 0.612 7.697 2.682
ERR=expected rate of return on plan assets, LEV=(total liabilities-defined benefit liability)/(net assets+total unrecognized
obligations), OPI=(operating income+defined benefit cost)/the average amount of total assets for the period t-1 and t, CASH=
(cash flow from operating activities-increase(decrease) in provision for retirement benefits)/the average amount of total assets
for the period t-1 and t, TAX=(income taxes+defined benefit cost*40%)/(net income before taxes+defined benefit cost), FUND
=plan assets/PBO, DBSIZE=natural logarithm of PBO, HORIZON=natural logarithm of (PBO/service cost), DR=discount rate,
SIZE=natural logarithm of total assets, JSTOCK=5-year average market benchmark rate of return on Japanese stocks, JBOND=
5-year average market benchmark rate for return on Japanese bonds
Table 6. Correlation for the Effect of Pension Components and Other Financial Statement
Factors on ERR
ERR LEV OPI CASH TAX FUND DBSIZE HORIZON DR SIZE
ERR 1.000
LEV 0.054 1.000
OPI 0.011 -0.175 1.000
CASH 0.012 -0.127 0.419 1.000
TAX -0.008 -0.010 0.024 -0.012 1.000
FUND 0.008 -0.143 0.089 0.082 0.007 1.000
DBSIZE 0.225 -0.016 -0.003 -0.013 -0.004 -0.072 1.000
HORIZON 0.211 0.052 -0.106 -0.034 -0.012 0.057 0.548 1.000
DR 0.375 0.084 -0.007 -0.015 -0.006 -0.157 0.124 0.055 1.000
SIZE 0.163 0.101 0.026 0.097 -0.011 0.092 0.002 0.322 0.090 1.000
sample of 21,053 firms for fourteen years is identified. Financial data used in this study
were collected from Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (2015) which is provided
by the Nikkei Digital Media, Inc.
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the effect of pension components and other
financial statement factors on the determination of ERR. The correlation coefficients for the
variables are shown in Table 6. There is a relation between DBSIZE and HORIZON,
because (a) when a firm’s average service life of employees is longer than that at other
firms, and (b) other conditions including the number of employees, employees’ salaries or
discount rate are similar to those at other firms, the PBO would be larger. However, to test
the variance inflation factors on all independent variables in this model, there is no
multicollinearity recognized.
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The result of the panel data analysis is shown in Table 7. It indicates that cash flow from
operating activities and tax-paying status do not have an effect on the determination of
ERR. On the other hand, leverage and operating income have positive coefficients and are
significant. As for operating income, when a firm increases the ERR, this change decreases
defined benefit cost, which is included in operating income. However, the sign (plus or
minus) for operating income is opposite to what is expected, which indicates that firms
which recognize higher operating income tend to choose higher ERRs. Leverage has the
expected coefficient sign, which indicates that firms with high leverage adopt high ERRs.
Pension is defined as future payment of employees’ salaries. Plan assets should be managed
with consideration of future risks over a long time-span, owing to the significant effect of
defined benefit liability on the balance sheet. Firms appear to consider their financial
condition and increase the ERR to reduce the defined benefit cost, and thereby lessen the
impact of the volatility in securities markets that affects the return on plan assets. FUND has
the opposite sign from what is expected. Firms which manage employees’ retirement
benefits set their ERRs higher. These results reveal that Japanese listed firms consider their
financial condition in setting their ERRs.
Table 7. The Effect of Pension Components and Other Financial Statement Factors on
ERR
Variables Expected Signs Coefficient t-value Standard Error
Intercept -0.355 -4.200 *** 0.084
LEV + 0.012 4.166 *** 0.003
OPI - 0.414 2.292 * 0.181
CASH + 0.087 0.657 0.132
TAX - -0.002 -0.535 0.003
FUND - 0.208 7.786 *** 0.027
DBSIZE + 0.484 19.202 *** 0.025
HORIZON - 0.357 7.518 *** 0.048
DR + 0.703 57.728 *** 0.012
SIZE + 0.172 13.465 *** 0.013
JSTOCK + 0.003 2.941 ** 0.001
JBOND + 0.054 18.357 *** 0.003
Adjusted R2 0.211
N 21,053
***, **, *, † indicate statistical significance at 0.1, 1, 5, 10% levels respectively.
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All pension components are positive and significant. When the size of a firm and the
defined benefit plan are larger, the firm tends to adopt a higher ERR. Adopting higher ERRs
can decrease the amount of defined benefit cost. At the same time, it can be said that when
a firm and the defined benefit plan are large, a firm can achieve economies of scale for plan
asset management. As for investment horizon, the coefficient has a positive sign, which
indicates that firms with relatively younger workforces set their ERRs higher. The variable
for the discount rate has the expected sign. The level of discount rate is strongly related to
the level of ERR. As explained in Section 3, firms tend to set their ERRs higher than the
discount rate. When a firm sets its ERR higher than the discount rate, it reduces the amount
of defined benefit cost. This result shows that firms adopting higher discount rates also set
their ERRs higher. Therefore, there is a possibility that firms control the amount of defined
benefit cost to reduce the volatility in defined benefit cost. When there is a difference
between actual rate and expected rate, firms can adopt deferred recognition and equalize the
cost. Adopting deferred recognition also reduces the volatility in defined benefit cost. The
market benchmark rates of return on Japanese stocks and Japanese bonds are important
factors for determining a firm’s ERR. The accounting standards require firms to set their
ERRs based on the information related to their plan assets and economic circumstances, and
this result shows that firms follow the standards.
7. Summary and Conclusion
Accounting standards for retirement benefits allow firms to adopt two distinct accounting
methods, deferred recognition for actuarial gains and losses and the principle of changes in
actuarial assumptions. These accounting methods make the accounting standards difficult to
understand for financial statement readers. One reason why these accounting methods are
adopted appears to be the significant effect of the change in actuarial assumptions on the
amount of defined benefit obligations and defined benefit cost. As explained above,
Okumura (2005) states that if a firm increases the discount rate one percentage point under
certain conditions, defined benefit obligations will drop by 23%. The actuarial assumptions
are affected by social and economic circumstances which cannot be controlled by firms.
This paper aimed to discover if pension components and other financial statement factors
have any effect on the determination of the ERR. The result shows that leverage has an
effect on the determination of ERR. As for pension components, the coefficient for the
discount rate has the expected sign. There is a possibility that firms setting their discount
rates higher adopt higher ERRs, and control the amount of defined benefit cost for the
period. This outcome indicates that firms set their ERRs with consideration of their financial
condition, and equalize the amount of defined benefit cost for each period to reduce the
volatility in the calculation of PBO and plan assets. The ERR is set based on a firm’s
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information related to plan assets. As the IASB states, it is difficult to determine the rate in
an objective way. Japanese listed firms have tended to set their ERRs higher than discount
rates; however, the movement of these rates has been similar. Understanding the pension
components in footnotes helps financial statement users to judge if the ERR is appropriate.
This research can be expanded further. This paper aimed to reveal whether the level of
leverage, ROA, cash flow, and tax-paying status affected the level of ERR. It can be also
analyzed whether changes in these variables affect changes in ERR. As shown in Table 3 in
Section 3, most firms do not change their ERRs every year. It may be useful to categorize
firms into three categories — firms increasing ERRs, those with no change, and those
decreasing ERRs — and analyze the effect of changes in other financial statement factors on
the changes in ERRs.
In Japan, new accounting standards, ASBJ Statement 26 and ASBJ Guidance 25 have
been adopted since fiscal 2013. Under the new accounting standards, firms are required to
disclose the allocation of plan assets and actual return on plan assets as items related to plan
assets in footnotes. These items might be important for predicting the ERR. Therefore,
including these new disclosure items as independent variables in the model might help to
explain the ERR.5
Moreover, the IASB and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) require firms to
disclose their plan asset allocation with more detailed categories. The more detailed
information should allow financial statement users to predict the ERR properly, because the
rates of return on foreign securities are much higher than those on domestic ones in Japan.
FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.132R: Employers’ Disclosures
about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits (SFAS132R) became effective from
December 2003. Firms tended to categorize their plan assets into fewer than the four
categories Japanese firms currently disclose under SFAS132R. In December 2008, FASB
issued FASB Staff Position No.FAS132(R)-1: Employers’ Disclosures about Postretirement
Benefit Plan Assets (FSP FAS132(R)-1). It is effective for fiscal years ending after
December 15, 2009. The Position states that firms disclose their pension plans and other
postretirement benefit plans at the fair value of each major category of plan assets. The
major categories include cash and cash equivalents; equity securities (segregated by industry
type, company size, or investment objective); debt securities issued by national, state, and
local governments; corporate debt securities; investment funds; and real estate (FSP FAS132
(R)-1, par.9). There are about 35 Japanese listed firms adopting SFAS in each year from
2003 to 2014. Therefore, using these firms as samples, it is possible to analyze the data in
chronological order after the firms disclose their plan asset allocation. We also can test
5 However, the sample number would be limited to fiscal 2013 and 2014 in this case.
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whether the detailed information provide more useful information for financial statement
users after fiscal 2009.
As for IAS19, the revised IAS19 has been adopted since fiscal 2013. The sample number
will not be sufficient for performing empirical research to examine whether the detailed
information has an effect on the determination of ERRs, since currently only around 70
firms adopt IFRS in Japan. However, IAS19 also requires firms to disclose sensitivity
analysis on the ERR and discount rate. Therefore, analyzing the information provided by
IAS19 and SFAS132R would be helpful for understanding if it is useful for investor
decision-making.
Table 4 in Section 3 showed the effect of pension components on financial statements. It
indicates that pension components had some effects on both the balance sheet and income
statement. The effect of defined benefit liability on total liabilities was especially significant,
and the rates ranged from 8% to 19%. Actuarial assumptions have an important role to play
in calculating the pension components of PBO, plan assets, defined benefit liability, and
defined benefit cost. The assumptions are strongly influenced by securities markets that
reflect social and economic circumstances, and have high uncertainty and volatility. This
paper indicates that firms set their ERRs depending on their financial condition; therefore, it
is important to disclose detailed information related to the ERRs to maintain objectivity.
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